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INTEGRATIVE CONCEPTUAL REVIEW
Motivated Cognition and Fairness: Insights, Integration, and Creating a
Path Forward
Laurie J. Barclay
Wilfrid Laurier University
Michael R. Bashshur
Singapore Management University
Marion Fortin
University of Toulouse 1 Capitole
How do individuals form fairness perceptions? This question has been central to the fairness literature since
its inception, sparking a plethora of theories and a burgeoning volume of research. To date, the answer to this
question has been predicated on the assumption that fairness perceptions are subjective (i.e., “in the eye of the
beholder”). This assumption is shared with motivated cognition approaches, which highlight the subjective
nature of perceptions and the importance of viewing individuals arriving at those perceptions as active and
motivated processors of information. Further, the motivated cognition literature has other key insights that
have been less explicitly paralleled in the fairness literature, including how different goals (e.g., accuracy,
directional) can influence how individuals process information and arrive at their perceptions. In this
integrative conceptual review, we demonstrate how interpreting extant theory and research related to the
formation of fairness perceptions through the lens of motivated cognition can deepen our understanding of
fairness, including how individuals’ goals and motivations can influence their subjective perceptions of
fairness. We show how this approach can provide integration as well as generate new insights into fairness
processes. We conclude by highlighting the implications that applying a motivated cognition perspective can
have for the fairness literature and by providing a research agenda to guide the literature moving forward.
Keywords: motivated cognition, fairness, justice, motives, perception
Something is ‘fair’ . . . because some person or persons believe it to be.
—Cropanzano, Goldman, and Benson (2005, p. 63).
Are our social judgments fully determined by our social knowledge, or
are they also influenced by our feelings and desires?
—Kunda (1999, p. 1)
Fairness is a fundamental concern for individuals and organiza-
tions with important implications for a wide range of outcomes (cf.
Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001; Colquitt et al.,
2013; Rupp, Shao, Jones, & Liao, 2014). One of the most central
questions in the fairness literature has examined how people per-
ceive fairness (cf. Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001).
Researchers have tackled this question from a variety of angles,
sparking a voluminous number of studies and an impressive array
of theories. Whereas some theories have focused on why people
care about fairness (e.g., instrumental, relational, and deontic mod-
els), others have emphasized the processes underlying the forma-
tion of fairness perceptions (e.g., equity theory, fairness theory,
and fairness heuristic theory). Despite the diversity of approaches,
research in this area has been predicated on two key assumptions.
First, fairness is in the “eye of the beholder”—that is, fairness is a
subjective experience that depends on the individual(s) involved
and how they perceive fairness issues (Greenberg, Bies, & Eskew,
1991). Second, fairness can be a motivated phenomenon in which
individual and environmental factors influence perceptions and
responses (Cropanzano, Byrne, et al., 2001).
As the literature has evolved and permeated other fields, these key
tenets have often taken a less prominent role, sometimes fading into
the background. However, numerous scholars have recently called for
a refocusing of attention on the subjectivity of fairness perceptions
(e.g., Brockner, Wiesenfeld, Siegel, Bobocel, & Liu, 2015; Guo,
Rupp, Weiss, & Trougakos, 2011; Rupp, 2011; Shapiro, 2001; Sha-
piro, 2010; Weiss & Rupp, 2011; Whiteside & Barclay, 2015).
We aim to make two main theoretical contributions. First, we
provide an integrative review of critical issues related to the
formation of fairness perceptions, including why individuals care
about fairness (i.e., fairness motives), the processes underlying
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when, how, and why individuals process fairness information (e.g.,
automatic vs. controlled processing), and how affect (e.g., moods,
emotions) and ones’ perspective (e.g., recipient, observer, or actor)
can influence fairness perceptions. Second, we examine how ap-
plying a motivated cognition perspective can enrich our under-
standing of the above questions and provide deeper insights into
the subjectivity of fairness perceptions. Further, we demonstrate
how a motivated cognition perspective can provide an integrative
framework that helps reconcile the various theories and findings
that have emerged in the literature. Specifically, theories in this
domain have different perspectives on how fairness perceptions
are generated (e.g., by automatic vs. controlled processes) and how
perceptions can be influenced by various motives. We propose that
recognizing the common foundation provided by a motivated
cognition perspective can synthesize findings, highlight synergies
across seemingly disconnected lines of research, and generally
enhance our understanding of fairness perceptions.
We begin by providing a brief overview of the key tenets of the
motivated cognition approach. Next, we address the question of
why a motivated cognition approach should be applied to the
fairness literature and why this may be the ideal time to integrate
these literatures. This is followed by a review of key questions in
the contemporary fairness literature relating to the formation of
fairness perceptions and a discussion of how a motivated cognition
approach can provide insights and integration for these questions.
Finally, we discuss the implications that this approach has for the
fairness literature and advance an agenda for future research.
What Is Motivated Cognition?
Motivated cognition (also termed motivated reasoning) approaches
are based on the fundamental assumption that people should be
viewed as active and motivated processors of information (Kunda,
1990). Within this context, motivation (“motives”) refers to “any
wish, desire, or preference that concerns the outcome of a given
reasoning task” (Kunda, 1990, p. 480). These motives can initiate
cognitive processes as well as influence the type and the nature of the
processing that occurs (Dunning, Kunda, & Murray, 1999).
There is general agreement that motives fall into two classes—
directional and nondirectional (Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990).
Whereas directional motives are aimed at reaching a specific conclu-
sion, nondirectional motives are often geared toward obtaining the
most accurate conclusion possible (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).
Both directional and nondirectional motives can guide cognitive pro-
cesses by influencing the choice of beliefs and strategies that individ-
uals use to support the desired conclusion (e.g., by initiating recall,
information searches). As an example, a directional motive might
focus on beliefs and strategies that allow people to see themselves in
a positive light while the nondirectional motive of accuracy relies on
beliefs and strategies that are likely to yield a “correct” conclusion.
Given the importance of directional and nondirectional motives for
motivated cognition, we provide an overview of these motives before
examining how (and why) a motivated cognition perspective can be
applied to the fairness literature.
Nondirectional (Accuracy) Versus Directional Motives
Although different nondirectional motives have been explored
(e.g., desire for clarity, closure; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), the
vast majority of research on nondirectional motives have empha-
sized accuracy (e.g., Kunda, 1990). Accuracy motives focus on
arriving at the most precise, appropriate, or “correct” conclusion,
regardless of what the conclusion may be (Kunda, 1990). When
activated, accuracy motives encourage people to spend more cog-
nitive effort carefully processing information, attending to relevant
information, and using more complex rules (Kunda, 1990). How-
ever, being motivated to be accurate does not guarantee that people
will be more accurate (cf. Kruglanski & Freund, 1983).
In contrast to accuracy motives, directional motives encourage
people to use strategies that allow them to reach a desired conclu-
sion (see Dunning, 1999 for a review). However, individuals are
not at liberty to arrive at any conclusion that they wish; rather, their
ability to arrive at a desired conclusion is constrained by whether
they can provide a seemingly rational justification for the conclu-
sion (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). This desire to maintain “an
illusion of objectivity” can influence the way that individuals
process information. For example, they can selectively draw on
memories or information (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999) or creatively
combine knowledge to construct beliefs to support their desired
conclusion (Kunda, 1990), both processes that may occur outside
of conscious awareness.
Notably, accuracy and directional motives are not orthogonal
and the presence of an accuracy goal does not “switch off” the
motivational processes linked to directional goals. Rather, a direc-
tional motive can combine with an accuracy motive thereby en-
couraging people to more deeply process information while simul-
taneously searching more arduously for evidence that can support
their desired conclusion. At the same time, one’s ability to reach a
desired conclusion is constrained by the availability of evidence to
support that conclusion (or the presence of irrefutable evidence
against it). That is, accuracy can also constrain the influence of
directional motives, such that people “will believe undesirable
evidence if they cannot refute it, but they will refute it if they can”
(Kunda, 1990, p. 490).
Why Should a Motivated Cognition Perspective Be
Applied to Fairness and Why Now?
Within the fairness literature, the pendulum is currently swing-
ing toward a renewed appreciation of the subjectivity of fairness
perceptions. This involves a move (a) from the consequences of
fairness and toward an emphasis on its antecedents (i.e., treating
fairness as a dependent variable), (b) from conditions that have
fostered an emphasis on the objective rules of justice and toward
the subjectivity of fairness, and (c) from increasing fragmentation
of the theories and toward integration. This state of transition has
created the ideal time for the integration of motivated cognition
into the fairness literature. In this section, we outline these chang-
ing conditions, highlight how a motivated cognition perspective
can respond to and shape these paradigmatic shifts, and examine
how this perspective can facilitate the integration of theories and
findings within this complex literature.
Riding the Fifth Wave of Fairness: Emerging
Research on Fairness as a Dependent Variable
In their historical review, Colquitt, Greenberg, and Zapata-
Phelan (2005) noted that the literature has been characterized by
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four major waves, (a) a distributive justice wave (i.e., the fairness
of outcomes, such as pay; Adams, 1965), (b) a procedural justice
wave (i.e., the fairness of procedures used to derive the outcomes;
Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), (c) an interactional
justice wave (i.e., the fairness of interpersonal treatment; Bies &
Moag, 1986), and (d) an integration wave (i.e., examining the
dimensionality of justice and interplay between the justice dimen-
sions; Colquitt, 2001).1 Notably, these waves have all focused on
the consequences of fairness (cf. Brockner et al., 2015). However,
there is increasing attention on the antecedents of fairness, which
highlight the psychological states and motivations that can affect
individuals’ fairness perceptions (i.e., “fairness as a dependent
variable”; Folger & Skarlicki, 2001). Brockner et al. (2015) have
termed this the “fifth wave” of fairness research. Given that a
central focus of the motivated cognitions literature is on how
motives influence cognition (Kunda, 1990), we propose that the
increasing attention on the antecedents of fairness provides an
opportunity as well as a point of assimilation for the introduction
of the principles of motivated cognition into the fairness literature.
That is, a motivated cognition perspective can enhance our under-
standing of the antecedents and processes underlying fairness
perceptions.
Subjectivity of Fairness: Moving Beyond Assessments
of Objective Criteria
Three significant shifts in the literature indicate the re-
emergence of an emphasis on the subjectivity of fairness percep-
tions. First, traditionally there has been a strong focus on identi-
fying the various justice rules and criteria that people can use when
evaluating fairness (e.g., distributive rules, such as equity, equal-
ity, and need, Deutsch, 1975; procedural rules, such as consis-
tency, Leventhal, 1980; interactional rules, such as truthfulness,
Bies & Moag, 1986). However, with the emergence of person-
centric perspectives, researchers are now calling for more empha-
sis on how individuals subjectively perceive and experience fair-
ness rather than how objective criteria are subjectively filled (e.g.,
Guo et al., 2011; Rupp, 2011).
Second, despite the ubiquity of indirect scales that assess the
degree to which a justice rule or criteria has been met (e.g.,
Colquitt, 2001), there have been concerns about whether this type
of measurement can capture the “depth and richness of individu-
als’ justice experiences” (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009a, p. 491)
and whether these measures reflect the way that individuals form
fairness perceptions. For example, questions have been raised
about how individuals assess and aggregate these rules to form
fairness perceptions, whether other rules should be considered,
whether individuals are motivated to use these rules, and what
drives these assessments (for a recent discussion, see Cropanzano,
Fortin, & Kirk, 2015). As researchers seek to answer these ques-
tions and begin to adopt new measures (e.g., overall justice;
Ambrose & Schminke, 2009a), it is important to consider subjec-
tivity in these processes.
Third, the contemporary literature has typically used the terms
justice and fairness synonymously and only recently have these
constructs been clearly differentiated (cf. Goldman & Cropanzano,
2015). Whereas “justice” reflects whether a set of normative rules
or standards has been adhered to, “fairness” reflects subjective and
evaluative judgments about rules and standards, with an emphasis
on how individuals’ motives, needs, and desires subjectively in-
fluence their evaluative processes and experiences.2 Given emerg-
ing empirical studies showing the dissimilar nature of these con-
structs (e.g., Ambrose & Schminke, 2009a; Kim & Leung, 2007),
a number of researchers have called for theoretical and empirical
distinctions to be made between these constructs (e.g., Colquitt &
Rodell, 2015; Cugueró-Escofet & Rosanas, 2013; Goldman &
Cropanzano, 2015). We argue that a motivated cognition perspec-
tive is particularly well suited for improving our understanding of
the subjectivity of fairness.
A Burgeoning and Complex Literature: The Risks of
Silos and Fragmentation
As fairness research has developed, the literature has been both
blessed and vexed by the plethora of theories that have emerged.
On the one hand, the surfeit of theories has provided a deep
understanding of core questions. For example, several theories
address why people care about fairness (e.g., instrumental, rela-
tional, and deontic models) and several more examine the pro-
cesses underlying how people assess fairness (e.g., equity theory,
fairness heuristic theory, and fairness theory). On the other hand,
the presence of differing perspectives for the same phenomenon
can create confusion, a lack of cohesion, conflicting findings, and
the possibility that “opposing models might apply in different
situations” (Cropanzano, Byrne, et al., 2001, p. 173). Further,
despite sharing a common foundation, the theories are often used
in ways that focus on differences rather than similarities. Indeed,
the literature is developing “silos” in which researchers are not
fully acknowledging the research associated with a different the-
ory, are failing to acknowledge how disparate theories may yield
different insights, and/or are not explicitly recognizing why one
particular theory is more appropriate than another for a specific
research question. The result is an increasingly complex and frag-
mented literature. In this review, we argue that motivated cogni-
tion can help distill these theories to a more foundational frame-
work, while recognizing their commonalities and distinctions.
Although each theory provides a piece of the puzzle, adopting a
motivated cognition perspective can help create a broader over-
view by generating more generalized insights and unity to the
field.
The Case for Motivated Cognitions: Fairness as a
Motivated Phenomenon
Applying a motivated cognition perspective to the fairness lit-
erature is a natural fit given its shared emphasis on subjectivity and
1 Colquitt’s (2001) influential article recognized the separate dimension-
ality of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice as well as further
delineated interactional justice into interpersonal justice (i.e., treatment
reflecting respect and dignity; Bies & Moag, 1986) and informational
justice (i.e., providing an adequate explanation; Greenberg, 1993).
2 To maintain consistency with the literature, we will often use the
phrasing used by original studies, even though it may not be reflective of
this distinction. For example, the measure of overall “justice” (cf. Ambrose
& Schminke, 2009) is more reflective of “fairness” because it taps into
individuals’ subjective assessments of fairness without explicitly examin-
ing justice rules. In our own arguments, we aim to use the terms fairness
and justice with this distinction in mind.
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869A MOTIVATED COGNITION PERSPECTIVE ON FAIRNESS
strong theoretical foundation for understanding how motivation
can shape perceptions. In fact, to some extent, this perspective is
already embedded in the fairness literature. Although few studies
have explicitly drawn upon this perspective, numerous studies
have implicitly used a motivated cognition perspective. In the next
section, we examine key questions in contemporary fairness re-
search. We demonstrate how an explicit and more systematic
application and appreciation of the motivated cognition perspec-
tive can yield new insights and a path forward for fairness re-
searchers.
Critical Research Questions in the Fairness Literature:
Understanding the Influence of Motives, Processing,
Affect, and Perspectives
Fairness researchers have examined a number of important
research questions related to the formation of fairness perceptions.
Within each of these research domains, however, “silos” have
developed as researchers tackle these questions using different
perspectives and without always acknowledging alternative per-
spectives. In this section, we examine four main research areas that
have emerged in the literature. We highlight the key insights
within these domains and how applying a motivated cognition
perspective to these questions can broaden those insights. Given
the plethora of theories in the fairness literature and their relevance
across multiple questions, we have chosen to selectively highlight
exemplar theories and studies. We begin by examining why people
care about fairness with a focus on instrumental, relational, and
moral fairness motives. Using uncertainty management theory, we
examine the interplay between these motives and integrate them
with the accuracy motive from the motivated cognition literature.
Next, we explore the processes underlying fairness perceptions
(i.e., controlled vs. automatic), with an emphasis on equity theory,
fairness heuristic theory, uncertainty management theory, and sys-
tem justification theory. We then build on this to investigate the
interplay between affect and cognitions in the formation of fairness
perceptions, using theories such as affect as information, affective
model of justice reasoning, affect infusion model, and deontic
models to guide our discussion. Finally, we examine the impor-
tance of perspective in fairness perceptions, with a focus on the
observer and actor as well as the influence of beliefs (e.g., just
world beliefs) and the importance of social emotions.
Research Question #1: Why Do People Care About
Fairness? The Role of Motives
Given the central role of fairness motives and the breadth of this
literature, several influential reviews have been offered (e.g., Cro-
panzano, Byrne, et al., 2001; Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, &
Schminke, 2001; Gillespie & Greenberg, 2005). Typically, these
reviews cluster the fairness motives into three streams: (a) instru-
mental, which highlights economic self-interest and control mo-
tives, (b) relational, which emphasizes belonging and esteem mo-
tives, and (c) moral, which stresses internalized moral duties and
norms. In this section, we briefly review the three streams, high-
light why these motives matter for fairness perceptions, and ex-
amine how these streams have been integrated. We conclude by
applying a motivated cognition lens to identify novel insights and
opportunities for further integration.
Instrumental motives. Within this category of motives, peo-
ple can care about fairness because it gives them control over their
outcomes and helps them feel confident that they will receive
beneficial outcomes in the future. These instrumental motives
typically reflect a self-interested perspective on fairness. For ex-
ample, a consistent finding in the literature is that people find
favorable outcomes to be fairer (i.e., the outcome favorability bias;
Skitka, Winquist, & Hutchinson, 2003). Numerous theories have
been classified into the domain of instrumental motives (for a
discussion, see Cropanzano, Rupp, et al., 2001), including broadly
based social exchange theories (e.g., equity-based theories; Ad-
ams, 1965), economic rationality (e.g., Brett, 1986), and the con-
trol model (e.g., Thibaut & Walker, 1975).
Relational motives. This category of motives focuses on how
fairness fulfills people’s need to feel good about themselves and
have a sense of belonging. That is, fairness matters because it
provides people with information about their relationship with the
group and whether they are respected members (e.g., Lind &
Tyler, 1988). Relational motives can have a powerful influence on
what individuals perceive to be fair and how fairness information
is used. For example, noninstrumental voice is a more powerful
predictor of procedural fairness perceptions when the voice is
granted by an in-group (vs. out-group) member (Platow et al.,
2013).
Moral motives. Whereas the instrumental and relational mo-
tives have often been characterized as self-interested (cf. Cropan-
zano, Byrne, et al., 2001), the moral motives category posits that
individuals care about fairness because it is “the right thing to do”
(e.g., Folger, 2001). That is, moral motives emphasize the impor-
tance of moral duties and norms. For example, the deontic per-
spective focuses on perceived “oughts” (Folger & Glerum, 2015)
and “moral accountability” (Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman,
2005) whereas the “justice motive” perspective is grounded in the
notion that people should get the treatment that they deserve (cf.
Lerner, 1980). The moral motives approach is exemplified by
research on observer reactions that illustrates that even as seem-
ingly “unaffected” bystanders people value fairness for its own
sake (e.g., Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002) and
are willing to abandon their own self-interest to punish unfair
decision makers (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986).
Key insights from the role of motives. While empirical sup-
port for each category of motives exists in abundance, scholars
have positioned the motives as complementary rather than com-
peting (cf. Cropanzano, Byrne, et al., 2001). On the one hand, this
has allowed research on each of the motives to proliferate, partic-
ularly for the instrumental and relational perspectives. On the other
hand, this has meant that these motives are seldom tested against
each other, which has obscured insights into when each motive has
the most explanatory value. Instead, studies frequently draw on
multiple perspectives (e.g., instrumental and relational) to support
the same argument rather than testing whether or how they relate
to one another. There are some notable exceptions and when these
motives are jointly tested the usefulness of this perspective be-
comes clear. For example, Lind, Kanfer, and Earley (1990)
showed that noninstrumental effects (relational motives) ac-
counted for incremental variance in fairness perceptions beyond
instrumental effects. The authors noted that “the entire range of
procedural justice phenomena can be explained only if it is ac-
cepted that fairness judgments are driven both by instrumental,
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informed self-interest concerns and by non-instrumental, group-
value concerns” (p. 953).
However, few attempts have been made to integrate instrumental
and relational motives. By contrast, research on moral motives has
consistently differentiated moral motives from other fairness motives
as well as clearly demonstrated the incremental predictive power of
moral motives (e.g., Folger, 2001; Turillo et al., 2002). Researchers
examining moral motives may have made this effort because of the
later emergence of this perspective, the initial focus of this perspective
on observers (as opposed to recipients), and/or an emphasis on inter-
personal fairness (i.e., assigning moral blame; Folger et al., 2005).
Given that each motive can explain variance in fairness percep-
tions and that the motives have been said to peacefully coexist, the
question becomes whether integration across motives is actually
needed. Some scholars have already tried. For example, Gillespie
and Greenberg (2005) advocated for a “motive hierarchy” that
ranks the various motives in terms of their importance to individ-
uals. However, these early integrative approaches do not reconcile
the substantial volume of evidence for the importance of each of
the motives nor do they recognize the interplay between the
motives. In fact, Cropanzano, Rupp, and colleagues (2001, p. 95)
pointed out that “premature integration could obscure unique in-
sights peculiar to one perspective” and that integration may be
difficult because of disparities in the underlying assumptions of
each stream. However, in the 15 years since this assertion, we
argue that the field has substantially matured and the literature is
now in need of integration. Without integration, it is difficult to
account for how the motives work together and parsimonious
explanations are hindered. Further, examining the motives in iso-
lation makes it difficult to examine the additive effects and inter-
actions that help explain the general dynamics of motivated fair-
ness in organizations. By focusing on each motive in (relative)
isolation, we may be losing the whole by emphasizing the parts.
Integrating motives with motivated cognition. Applying a
motivated cognition lens to this literature highlights the emphasis
that fairness research has placed on directional motives; instru-
mental, relational, and moral motives can stimulate the individual
to care about fairness for different reasons and guide the process-
ing of fairness information in different ways relative to their
specific emphasis (see integrative section below). By contrast,
accuracy—a key motive from the motivated cognition literature—
has been underemphasized or often overlooked. Instead, the term
accuracy has been relegated to being a quality of fair procedures
(cf. Colquitt, 2001; Leventhal, 1980). While research has shown
that fairness perceptions can be enhanced when decision makers
adhere to accuracy rules (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2001), whether
people are actually accurate when they make their fairness judg-
ments, and, more importantly, whether they are motivated to be
accurate in their fairness perceptions has received little attention.
On the one hand, it is questionable whether fairness perceptions
can ever truly be “accurate” partly because it is unclear what
accuracy means in this context. For example, accuracy requires the
assessor to have a complete set of information about all fairness-
relevant aspects, knowledge of what norms or rules to apply, and
the ability to correctly weight the rules to form perceptions. Even
then, the inherent subjectivity in fairness perceptions raises ques-
tions related to what normative rule is most appropriate and/or
what viewpoint should be adopted; factors that are also likely to be
chosen and perceived differently across individuals. On the other
hand, regardless of whether individuals can be “truly” accurate, it
seems plausible that people can care about accuracy as a fairness
motive. For example, individuals may seek to have an accurate
assessment of an event so that they can make appropriate deci-
sions. Similarly, accuracy may combine with directional motives,
such as when individuals are motivated to determine their actual
standing in a group so that they can take action to improve their
standing (or exit the group). In these cases, an accuracy goal may
enhance the effortful processing of information while the presence
of a directional goal biases one’s information search.
Uncertainty management theory seems particularly relevant for
explaining when and why the accuracy motive may be present in the
formation of fairness perceptions (cf. van den Bos, 2001). People who
are motivated to reduce uncertainties may also be motivated to be
more accurate because this can enhance their ability to predict future
unfairness and lessen the possibility of unpleasant surprises and dis-
appointments. This notion has received some empirical support. For
example, Ambrose, Harland, and Kulik (1991) found that people who
were given high control over an outcome focused on this outcome
when forming their fairness perceptions. However, people who had
less control over an outcome (i.e., more uncertainty) incorporated
additional information into their fairness perceptions (i.e., the out-
comes that others received). This suggests that uncertainty can trigger
a more thorough search for information, and arguably activate accu-
racy motives. However, it is also possible that individuals can be less
motivated for accuracy or less able to engage in accuracy under
certain circumstances (e.g., when they lack coping resources; Lazarus,
1991).
There are also likely to be some instances in which accuracy and
directional goals conflict. Using the example above, although indi-
viduals may be motivated to make an accurate assessment of their
standing in a group, this may also be self-threatening (e.g., if they
have low standing). Thus, they may also be motivated to engage in
self-protective behaviors to maintain their relational needs. This sug-
gests that directional goals may constrain the influence of accuracy
goals on processing, with important moderators determining when
each motive is likely to be most influential. This also implies that it is
critical to examine not only how these motives activate processing but
also how they influence how this processing unfolds.
Taken together, by introducing nondirectional motives and fa-
cilitating the integration of the current fairness motives, it is clear
that a motivated cognition approach can deepen our understanding
of why people care about fairness. Further, using motivated cog-
nitions as a foundation allows distinctions between the motives to
be maintained, while also providing parsimony for the effects.
Applying a motivated cognition lens also raises important ques-
tions, such as what happens when motives are in conflict, how do
these motives interact with each other, and how does this interplay
between the motives influence how fairness information is pro-
cessed? We return to some of these questions in our integrative
discussion below. For now, we shift our focus to examining how
fairness information is processed.
Research Question #2: How Do People Form Fairness
Perceptions? The Role of Controlled Versus
Automatic Processing
Theories within the fairness literature have diverged in their em-
phasis on the processes through which fairness perceptions are
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871A MOTIVATED COGNITION PERSPECTIVE ON FAIRNESS
formed. Whereas some theories emphasize the formation of fairness
perceptions through a careful, effortful, and conscious consideration
and evaluation of information (i.e., controlled or systematic process-
ing), other theories suggest that fairness perceptions can rely on more
readily available information for quick judgments (i.e., automatic
processing). Further, some researchers have noted that the various
fairness theories can be categorized by where they fall on a continuum
from controlled to automatic processing (e.g., Bobocel, McCline, &
Folger, 1997; Cropanzano, Byrne, et al., 2001). However, as Cropan-
zano, Byrne, et al (p. 171). noted in 2001, “researchers have not
adequately considered the implications of this continuum” and this
statement remains almost as true today as it was over a decade ago.
Although studies examining the formation of fairness perceptions
have emphasized both controlled and automatic approaches, few
studies have used an integrated approach that considers the interaction
between automatic and controlled processes (for an exception, see our
discussion of fairness theory below). In this section, we review in-
sights from each approach, identify areas in need of attention and
places for integration, and consider the opportunities highlighted by
motivated cognitions.
Key insights from controlled processing approaches.
Controlled processing approaches typically treat fairness perceptions
as the result of deliberate processing, often based on the evaluation of
justice rules or criteria (e.g., German, Fortin, & Read, 2016). For
example, equity theory suggests that people compare the ratio of their
own inputs/outputs to a referent other’s inputs/outputs ratio to deter-
mine if they are being treated fairly (Adams, 1965) while procedural
justice rules (e.g., consistency, bias suppression, accuracy, correct-
ability, ethicality, and representation) also require recall or processing
of an event or entity (Leventhal, 1980).
Support for the importance of controlled processing abounds in the
literature. In many cases, studies have emphasized rule-bound expla-
nations for the emergence of perceptions (e.g., Leventhal’s criteria,
equity theory) and have manipulated one or more rules (e.g., Lind et
al., 1990; Taylor, Tracy, Renard, Harrison, & Carroll, 1995) or ele-
ments of a situation (e.g., Thibaut & Walker, 1975) to examine how
this influences evaluations of fairness. Further, studies overwhelm-
ingly focus on the recipient, but actors and observers can also use
cognitively oriented judgment processes, applying justice rules to
generate fairness perceptions. Skarlicki and Rupp (2010), for exam-
ple, examined how engaging in rational versus experiential processing
after observing another’s mistreatment influences observers’ retribu-
tive tendencies (see also: Research Question #4: How Does Perspec-
tive Influence Fairness Perceptions?).
Finally, the literature tends to emphasize one rule or one norm
at a time; for example, voice may be given or taken away, rules
may be applied consistently or not. However, as Cropanzano et al.
(2015, p. 326) point out, people may apply different rules at
different times, they may weigh the rules differently over time, or
they may simply not “consciously examine the full range” of
justice rules. This last point takes us to research on what happens
when individuals are unwilling or unable to process all the relevant
fairness information in a given context. That is, when people use
an automatic process to form their perceptions of fairness.
Key insights from automatic processing approaches.
Individuals are not always motivated to systematically process fair-
ness information (German et al., 2016). Instead, they may use auto-
matic processing, which occurs outside of awareness, involves less
effort, and uses relatively few cognitive resources (Kunda, 1999).
Within the fairness literature, the dominant theories examining auto-
matic processes are fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001) and uncer-
tainty management theory (van den Bos, 2001).
In fairness heuristic theory, Lind (2001) argues that people are
motivated to form fairness perceptions relatively quickly upon enter-
ing a work situation (“judgment phase”), creating a heuristic that
guides daily life and interactions in the organization (“use phase”).
Individuals rely on these heuristics until a critical phase-shifting event
occurs that necessitates a reappraisal of the heuristic (e.g., recognizing
that the relationship in question is changing or that an event is outside
of what would be expected from the heuristic). In these cases, indi-
viduals will return to the judgment phase to recalibrate the fairness
perception. Empirical support for this assertion has been provided by
numerous studies. For example, Lind, Kray, and Thompson (2001)
found that fairness perceptions are strongly influenced by the first
fairness information that a person encounters in a new situation (i.e.,
primacy effect) and that fairness information presented later is far less
influential. Similarly, people can experience a confirmatory bias (i.e.,
an automatic process whereby ones’ expectations come to match
perceptions), such that their expectations for fairness (i.e., “anticipa-
tory” fairness) predict the extent to which they perceive fairness (i.e.,
“experienced” fairness; Rodell & Colquitt, 2009; Shapiro & Kirkman,
2001).
In uncertainty management theory, van den Bos (2001) high-
lights the importance of uncertainty for determining when and why
fairness matters to people. Basic tenets of this theory include the
notions that people have a fundamental need to feel certain, are
motivated to reduce uncertainty because it can be threatening, and
therefore, care more about fairness when they feel uncertain. On
the one hand, uncertainty may lead to the effortful processing of
information; increased uncertainty may be one of the mechanisms
by which individuals move from the “use” phase back into the
“judgment” phase (cf. Proudfoot & Lind, 2015). On the other
hand, uncertainty can play a more automatic role in the formation
of fairness perceptions. For example, personal uncertainty can
trigger the “human alarm system” that can cause individuals to
unconsciously form more extreme fairness judgments because they
feel uncertain and/or self-threatened (van den Bos et al., 2008).
Fairness heuristic theory, and to a lesser extent uncertainty
management theory, have dominated the literature on automatic
fairness perceptions. However, there are other emerging perspec-
tives that identify additional antecedents of automatic processes
and/or types of automatic processes that can influence the forma-
tion of fairness perceptions. We examine individual differences,
system justification theory, and moral mandates as examples.
Individual differences. Numerous studies have emerged fo-
cusing on how individual differences can work in a manner similar
to a heuristic (i.e., filtering fairness-relevant information to shape
fairness perceptions). For example, Bianchi and Brockner (2012)
found that people who were more trusting (i.e., have higher dis-
positional trust) had more positive perceptions of fairness, even
when they were exposed to identical fairness information as those
who had lower dispositional trust. Similarly, Holtz and Harold
(2009) showed that trust predicted variance in fairness perceptions
both within and between individuals over time. Specifically, em-
ployees who trusted their supervisors perceived more fairness and
had more stable fairness perceptions over time than employees
who did not trust their supervisors. This suggests that trust can
operate in an automatic, heuristic-like manner. Likewise, individ-
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872 BARCLAY, BASHSHUR, AND FORTIN
uals respond more strongly to voice when they hold a proself
versus a prosocial orientation (van Prooijen et al., 2008). Again,
the frame or filter through which employees view their environ-
ment shapes how they perceive fairness information.
System justification theory. Another perspective on auto-
matic fairness judgments gaining traction in the literature is the
system justification approach. Jost and Banaji (1994) argue that
people have a motivated tendency to perceive the systems (e.g.,
organizations, societies) that they work and live in to be fair. As a
result, unfairness can be perceived as particularly threatening and
may (ironically) result in employees defending unfair procedures
to preserve their belief that the system is fair (Proudfoot & Lind,
2015). Using samples from the United States and Hungary, van der
Toorn, Berkics, and Jost (2010) found that people with strong
system justification tendencies perceived more fairness when they
were asked to evaluate things that were typical of their own culture
or society. A system justification perspective also nicely integrates
with uncertainty management theory; employees can reduce un-
certainty and manage threat by believing that their environment is
the way it should be (i.e., the system is fair). However, although
system justification theory is often described in terms of automa-
ticity, it may also be possible for people to engage in controlled
processing, in which they are consciously and actively motivated
to justify the system. Future research should test this possibility.
Moral mandates. Defined as “selective expressions of moral
values” (Skitka, 2003, p. 590), moral mandates are central to
people’s sense of personal identity. Further, people are motivated
to protect these positions from possible threat. Moral mandates
have taken on different roles within the literature. From a value
protection perspective (e.g., Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka &
Mullen, 2002), moral mandates have been argued to influence how
fairness is interpreted. Specifically, this perspective suggests that
outcomes and procedures are deemed to be legitimate and fair
when they are consistent with one’s moral mandate. That is, moral
mandates can “override” evaluations of procedures such that the
use of an objectively fair process does not improve perceptions of
distributive or procedural fairness when moral mandates are vio-
lated (e.g., Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka & Mullen, 2002).
However, other scholars have argued that perceptions of fairness
continue to matter even in the presence of strong moral mandates
(e.g., Napier & Tyler, 2008). This perspective holds that moral
mandates can influence and temper the effects of fairness but they
do not “override” the effects of fairness. Moreover, fairness itself
may also be considered a moral mandate for some individuals.
From a motivated cognition perspective, these different positions
suggest that moral mandate may have some automaticity (i.e.,
function at an unconscious level; Bargh, 1997) and/or may provide
a context in which more controlled processes can occur. Regard-
less of whether this is a truly automatic role or one in which
automaticity shapes controlled processes, it is clear that moral
mandates can influence fairness interpretations in a motivated
manner.
Integrating Automatic and Controlled Processing With
Motivated Cognitions
Although research examining automatic and controlled process-
ing has developed relatively independently, there is empirical and
theoretical evidence that integrating these perspectives can yield
fruitful insights. This possibility is highlighted by studies exam-
ining the interplay between individual differences and automatic/
controlled processing. Some research has shown that individual
differences can decrease the likelihood of controlled processing.
For example, research examining regulatory focus has indicated
that individuals can differ on whether they have a promotion
versus prevention focus, which can influence people’s emotions,
thoughts, and actions (cf. Higgins, 1998). Building on this foun-
dation, Li and colleagues (2011) examined the interactive effects
of promotion or prevention focus (primed) and how a message was
framed (as a gain or a loss) on the perceived fairness of unfavor-
able events, with an emphasis on regulatory fit (e.g., congruency
that results when a promotion focus is paired with explanation
framed as a gain). The presence of regulatory fit induced a “feel-
good” experience in individuals, thereby enhancing the tendency
to automatically process fairness information and decreasing the
use of consciously constructed counterfactuals to make sense of
the explanations that were provided. Specifically, individuals who
experienced a fit between their regulatory focus and the charac-
teristics of the explanation were less likely to believe that manag-
ers could or should have done something differently and conse-
quently were less likely to perceive unfairness. Other research has
shown that individual differences can enhance controlled process-
ing. De Cremer and Blader (2006), for example, demonstrated that
people with a stronger need to belong engaged in more systematic
processing of procedural fairness information.
There is also some research pointing to the possibility that
individuals shift between automatic and controlled processing.
Colquitt and Chertkoff (2002), for example, examined the effec-
tiveness of explanations in improving fairness perceptions and
how individuals may use two different processing strategies to
arrive at a fairness perception. The authors argued that the activa-
tion of these processes was dependent on whether expectations
related to the outcome were violated. Specifically, they suggested
that when expectations are violated, this should “trigger a shift to
systematic (rather than heuristic) processing strategy” (p. 604). In
such a situation, explanations for the violation should be especially
relevant. Indeed, explanations had the most positive effects in light
of unexpected, unfavorable outcomes. These findings also fit with
the idea of “phase shifts” from fairness heuristic theory. Further
support for the possibility of shifts between automatic to controlled
processing was provided by Mayer and colleagues (Mayer, Green-
baum, Kuenzi, & Shteynberg, 2009; Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum,
Bardes, & Salvador, 2009) who found that people were motivated
to retroactively look for flaws in procedures when they experi-
enced an outcome that violated their identity. The authors argued
that this switch to controlled processing and the deliberate search
for information postoutcome was driven by the need to justify
displeasure with the outcome.
However, not all theories and empirical evidence suggest that a
“shift” needs to occur between automatic and controlled process-
ing. For example, Kahneman (2011) suggests that these processes
are likely to work in tandem, although in complex and blended
ways. This suggests that these processes can coexist and influence
each other. Consistent with this approach, fairness theory provides
an example of the potential interplay between automatic and
controlled processing as well as how these processes can shape
each other (cf. Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, 2001). Specifically,
fairness theory emphasizes the role of counterfactuals (e.g., would,
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873A MOTIVATED COGNITION PERSPECTIVE ON FAIRNESS
could, or should) in generating assessments of accountability.
Whereas its predecessor, referent cognitions theory (RCT; Folger,
1987), focused on the active/conscious construction and compar-
ison of referents, fairness theory allows for the possibility that
counterfactuals can occur at an unconscious level. That is, coun-
terfactuals can occur more automatically (cf. Bargh, 1997), such
that individuals do not need to consciously bring to mind alterna-
tives to generate a counterfactual (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001).
Further, counterfactuals that operate outside of conscious aware-
ness can create a background or context that can shape controlled
processes. Similar to the way that gray appears lighter against a
black background but darker against a white background, the
presence of a counterfactual outside of conscious awareness can
provide a background that can influence controlled processes.3
A motivated cognition perspective can significantly enhance our
understanding of these processes. For example, the above studies
by Mayer and colleagues highlight the influential role of motives
in shifting the processing of fairness-relevant information from
primarily automatic to controlled or vice versa. System justifica-
tion theory also ties together elements from motivated reasoning
with controlled and automatic processing. In this perspective,
people maintain the belief that their organization is fair by self-
protectively rationalizing unfairness, changing frames, or simply
applying only those justice rules that do not induce dissonance
(e.g., switching to an equality rule from an equity rule to defend a
lack of merit based pay; Cropanzano et al., 2015). Interestingly,
people only override this protective tendency when the evidence
becomes too overwhelming to ignore or when the transgression is
too extreme (Proudfoot & Lind, 2015). This insight sits nicely
within the duality of accuracy and directional goals that is so
central to motivated reasoning. People will perceive what they
want to perceive for as long as they can, but once they can no
longer refute the evidence, they will accept it.
The role of motivated cognition in the relationship between
controlled and automatic processes does not end there. Although
fairness heuristic theory (and system justification theory) suggest
that a vivid (or undeniable) instance of unfairness has to occur
before people reevaluate their heuristic and move out of the “use”
phase, motivated reasoning would suggest that a simple shift in
goals (e.g., from accuracy to feeling good) can just as easily lead
to “phase shifting.” Applying a motivated perspective can allow
predictions about the extent to which the new heuristic would be
bound by both accuracy and directional goals, thereby providing a
more fine-grained approach to the phase shifting process.
Similarly, the motivated cognition literature shows that people’s
thinking is guided by their preferred outcomes (i.e., what people
want to be true is perceived as true), particularly under conditions
of uncertainty (e.g., Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989).
Combining this with uncertainty management theory has interest-
ing implications for how fairness perceptions might unfold. Under
conditions of uncertainty, people may be paying more attention to
the fairness-relevant information in the environment (van den Bos
et al., 2008). However, motivated cognition suggests that they will
also be working harder to align these perceptions with what they
want to be true. Likewise, motivated reasoning indicates that
people’s ability to accurately process information will be bounded
by their available cognitive resources. For example, people have
difficulty meeting accuracy goals when they are depleted and
instead perform in a similar way to those with no motivation to be
accurate (Pendry & Macrae, 1994). In these instances, fairness
perceptions should be largely governed by directional goals (what
they want to perceive) and there may be constraints on when and
how people can shift into controlled processing.
Taken together, the above studies illustrate the richness that can
accompany an integrated perspective. However, for the literature
to be truly integrative, two more steps are necessary. First, it is
important to determine if there are indeed “shifts” that occur
between the processes (e.g., from mostly controlled to predomi-
nantly automatic) and, if so, what are the moderators that prompt
these shifts? Second, research is needed that fosters a deeper
understanding of the interplay between automatic and controlled
processes. Although the studies noted above often assume a shift
between processes, it may not always be necessary for a “shift” to
occur. These studies could also be reinterpreted to consider how
automatic processes can create a context for the influence of
controlled processes. That is, rather than triggering shifts between
processes, it may be important to examine how the presence of
factors related to automatic processes can influence controlled
processing (e.g., are rules preferentially selected, are comparisons
standards shifting upward/downward). Clearly, a motivated cog-
nition perspective can provide deep and rich insights into auto-
mated and controlled processing as well as the interplay between
these processes within the context of fairness, creating new re-
search directions that can enhance our understanding of how
fairness perceptions are formed.
Research Question #3: How Are Fairness Perceptions
Influenced by Affect and Its Interplay
With Cognitions?
Whereas early justice theories (e.g., Adams, 1965; Homans,
1961) and research (e.g., Mikula, 1986) emphasized the concom-
itant nature of emotions with the sense of (in)justice, the emphasis
on emotions faded as researchers focused on the cognitive aspects
of this phenomenon (cf. Barclay & Kiefer, 2014), perhaps because
of the cognitive revolution taking place within psychology. As an
emphasis on justice rules emerged, this highlighted controlled
processes and their attending cognitions, often at the expense of
affect. That is, cognition and affect were typically treated as
distinct constructs, with cognition being emphasized and emotion
taking a secondary role.4 Indeed, scholars have noted that affect
has been “underemphasized and underappreciated” (Bies & Tripp,
2001, p. 205) and is often “lost” within the cognitive landscape of
fairness (cf. Barclay & Kiefer, 2014, p. 1858). In their integrative
review of fairness and affect, Cropanzano, Stein, and Nadisic
(2011, p. 3) noted that “given the natural affinity between (in)jus-
tice and affect, integrating the two literatures has been slower than
one might expect.”
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.
4 There has been debate in other literatures about whether emotion and
cognition are distinct or whether emotion is a form of cognition (e.g.,
Forgas, 1995). Our review of the fairness literature suggests that emotion
and cognition are often treated as distinct constructs that nevertheless are
intricately related and have significant interplay. We leave the question of
whether emotion should be seen as part of cognition for future research.
For the purposes of this article, when we refer to the term cognition, we do
not refer to the emotional aspect.
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However, there has been a recent surge in affect-related research
within the fairness literature (Colquitt et al., 2013). The majority of
research in this domain has examined cognition and affect as
related but distinct constructs. Specifically, affect (particularly
emotions) has been predominately characterized as an outcome of
controlled and rational (“cold”) cognitive processes (cf. Cohen-
Charash & Byrne, 2008; van den Bos, 2007). However, affect can
also precede and/or accompany fairness perceptions (cf. Cohen-
Charash & Byrne, 2008). Researchers studying affect from this
perspective have emphasized the intricate interplay between affect
and cognition. For example, affect can initiate cognitive processes
(e.g., Haidt, 2000) and elicit appraisals that provide “a lens for
interpreting subsequent situations” (e.g., Lerner, Small, & Loew-
enstein, 2004, p. 337). That is, affect can influence the formation
of fairness perceptions through the creation of “hot cognitions”
(e.g., van den Bos, 2007). This suggests that emotion and cognition
may not be quite as distinct as had been assumed in the fairness
literature, but rather can have a complex interplay that together can
form perceptions (Forgas, 1995). In this section, we explore the
influence of affect on the formation of fairness perceptions. Fur-
ther, we distinguish between the influence of trait affect, moods
(i.e., generalized affective states), and emotions (i.e., targeted,
short-term affective states). We also examine the relationship
between affect and fairness motives as well as the ways that a
motivated reasoning perspective can provide further insights into
these processes.
Key insights from trait affect approaches. Individual differ-
ences in affect can influence the formation of fairness perceptions
through several pathways. Trait affect can (a) serve as a lens
through which individuals interpret stimuli (similar to our earlier
discussion on how individual differences influence cognitions), (b)
influence how individuals experience affective events, and (c)
impact the treatment that individuals receive from others thereby
influencing the likelihood of encountering fairness-related events
and requiring fairness-related evaluations (Barsky & Kaplan,
2007). Individual differences can also combine with other variables in
an automatic or controlled manner to influence the formation of
fairness perceptions. For example, Maas and van den Bos (2009)
examined how affect intensity interacts with experiential-intuitive or
rational-cognitive systems. Whereas experiential systems are more
passive, intuitively based, and focused on associative connections,
rational systems are more active, abstract, and focused on cause-effect
connections. Individuals with high affect intensity and who were
primed with an experiential mindset were found to react more
strongly to fairness-related events than those who were low on affect
intensity and primed with a rational mindset.
Key insights from mood approaches. Perhaps the most in-
fluential paradigm focusing on mood has involved the integration
of uncertainty management theory with affect as information.
Specifically, van den Bos (2003) argued that individuals can use
their affective state when forming fairness perceptions, particularly
under conditions of information uncertainty. When individuals
lack directly relevant information, they may rely on “how do I feel
about it” heuristics (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983) or affect-
infusion processes to form their fairness perceptions (e.g., Forgas,
1995, 2002). Indeed, Barsky and Kaplan’s (2007) meta-analysis
found that state positive affect enhanced whereas state negative
affect diminished fairness perceptions. Importantly, affect can
influence fairness perceptions even when the affective states are
incidental to the situation (i.e., have no logical or objective bearing
on the fairness perception being formed; van den Bos, 2003).
However, when directly relevant information is available, gener-
alized affective states have weaker effects on fairness judgments.
Individuals can also rely on their moods to determine if they
have a sufficient basis for forming perceptions, which can trigger
different types of processing. Generally speaking, negative moods
prompt systematic processing by signaling the presence of a threat
to one’s goals whereas positive moods can signal that the situation
is safe and that heuristic processing is sufficient (Schwarz & Clore,
1983). Despite the relevance of mood-related effects for fairness,
Cropanzano et al. (2011, p. 160) noted that fairness researchers
have paid “little heed” to these effects. In a later section, we
describe some of the innovative and elaborate theoretical perspec-
tives on the role of mood. For now, we turn to the key insights
from emotions.
Key insights from emotion approaches. Research has also
begun to explore how emotions can impact the content of judg-
ments, influence information processes, and shape how fairness
perceptions are encoded and aggregated (Barsky, Kaplan, & Beal,
2011; Cropanzano et al., 2011; Rupp & Paddock, 2010). Several
theories and studies have examined how emotions can initiate
different types of processing. On the automatic processing side,
individuals can experience emotions that reflect the unfairness of
an event (e.g., deontic anger or moral outrage) even when the
elements of the situation that are unfair are not consciously avail-
able to the individual (e.g., Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger,
2003; Folger, 2001). In these cases, fairness-related affect can be
particularly functional because it is related to the situation at hand
and can be used as a “rational” substitute for more controlled
processing (van den Bos, 2003). Tiedens and Linton (2001) found
that emotions can also shift preferences for the type of processing;
automatic processing is promoted by emotions that are character-
ized by certainty (e.g., anger), whereas controlled processing is
activated by uncertainty-related emotions (e.g., sadness).
Most research, however, emphasizes the role of controlled pro-
cessing, with attention focused on how emotions can influence
appraisal processes. For example, the presence of anger can en-
hance the tendency to perceive risk and make hostile attributions
(Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Further, emotions (e.g., anger, guilt) can
prompt cognitive assessments of the event (Scher & Heise, 1993).
The influence of emotions, however, can also be mitigated through
cognitive processes. For example, De Wit and van den Bos (2007)
found that when individuals experienced negative affect in reac-
tion to underpayment, they were more likely to view their outcome
as unfair. These effects were alleviated when people were told that
a (placebo) pill that they had taken had influenced their emotional
reactions. In this case, individuals were less likely to attribute their
negative feelings to the underpayment and therefore less likely to
feel unfairly treated. In contrast to uncertainty management theory,
which focuses on moods and examines affect as a substitute for
information, these studies suggest that moods and emotions can
also activate and influence the cognitive appraisal system (cf.
Cropanzano, Byrne, et al., 2001).
Other theories have explored the interactive and reciprocal na-
ture of emotions and fairness perceptions. Although some models
emphasize the role of cognitions (e.g., Mullen, 2007), there is also
recognition for the primacy of strong emotional states (e.g., Bies,
1987). When emotions are activated first, individuals’ deeply
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ingrained values and moral standards prompt them to deem some-
thing as “unfair” without engaging in logical reasoning or provid-
ing justifications. As Barsky et al. (2011, p. 252) argued, “ap-
praisal [for fairness perceptions] begins with a set of fast, relatively
automatic appraisals that are unmediated by conscious, delibera-
tive thought.” These experiences then activate secondary apprais-
als, in which individuals seek to provide meaning and interpret the
implications of the event (i.e., determine why it was unfair).
Interestingly, Barsky et al. (2011) noted that the emotions and
fairness literatures have differentially characterized the outcome of
secondary appraisals. Whereas the emotions literature suggests
that these appraisals give rise to discrete emotions, the fairness
literature indicates that these appraisals can yield counterfactuals
(e.g., would, could, and/or should counterfactuals; Folger & Cro-
panzano, 2001). Despite sometimes been characterized as a “cold”
perception, in actuality, counterfactuals are not limited to being
cognitive events. Indeed, counterfactuals can also include “coun-
terfactual emotions” (e.g., frustration, regret, grief; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1982). That is, counterfactuals can generate both emo-
tional and perceptual outcomes. In their theoretical model, Barsky
et al. (2011, p. 253) highlight how secondary appraisals are likely
to yield emotionally infused perceptions of fairness “because these
two processes occur in tandem.”
Integrating affect with motivated cognitions. Clearly, this is
an area ripe with potential for a motivated cognition perspective.
Indeed, motivated cognitions are already being explicitly consid-
ered, especially in extant theories. In this section, we overview
integrative theoretical perspectives that clarify the interplay be-
tween affect, fairness perceptions, and motivated cognitions. We
also provide examples of empirical findings that highlight the
insights that can be gained by integrating a motivated cognition
approach into this domain.
Theory and empirical research has indicated that affect can
motivate reasoning as well as preferences for directional versus
accuracy motives. For example, Mullen’s (2007) affective model
of justice reasoning suggests that people experience a primary
appraisal in which they examine whether the treatment was favor-
able or unfavorable. This is followed by an emotional state that
drives further processing. However, the nature of the processing
depends on the certainty of the emotions (see also Tiedens &
Linton, 2001). Individuals who have an initial negative appraisal
and experience a relatively certain emotional state (e.g., anger or
disgust) are likely to engage in controlled processing in which they
overvalue evidence consistent with these emotions. In contrast,
when emotions characterized by uncertainty are experienced after
the initial negative appraisal (e.g., fear) then individuals are more
likely to use controlled processing that favors accuracy. From a
motivated cognition perspective, this suggests that emotions can
influence the activation of directional or accuracy goals, which
guide the processing that occurs. Further, although it is often
assumed that emotions will bias cognitive assessments, Lench and
Bench (2015) found that strong positive or negative emotional
reactions can actually decrease biases when people had the time
and capacity to engage in controlled processing. This suggests that
accuracy motives may be triggered by either uncertain or strong
emotions.
There is evidence that moods can also influence the strategies
that individuals employ to process information (e.g., “affect infu-
sion model”; Forgas, 2000), whether it is direct access processing
(i.e., individual retrieves something from memory), motivated
processing (i.e., individual is motivated by a specific goal), heu-
ristic processing, (i.e., individual relies on automatic processing),
or substantive processing (i.e., individual relies on controlled pro-
cessing). Moods can also shape the content of the processing, such
as preferences for different justice rules. Sinclair and Mark (1991,
1992) found that, as compared to individuals in positive moods,
those in a negative mood were more discriminating between allo-
cation rules (equity, equality, and need), were less likely to endorse
egalitarian macrojustice principles, and were more likely to adhere
to equity when allocating outcomes. Taken together, this suggests
that mood not only serves as an input into the formation of
perceptions but it can also influence the nature of the processing,
including the activation of motivated reasoning and preferences for
justice rules.
The activation of accuracy goals can also influence the effect of
mood on processing strategies. Tiedens and Linton (2001, p. 973),
for instance, indicated that “when a person’s goal is accurate
judgment or decision making, that person will look to his or her
mood as an indicator of whether he or she knows enough.”
Emerging theories (e.g., Barsky et al., 2011) also integrate both
mood and emotions with motivated cognitions and fairness mo-
tives. For example, when motives are combined with moods and
emotions, individuals can change the priority given to information
related to threat versus rewards (Watson, 2000). Given that posi-
tive affect is related to approach motivations (Watson, Wiese,
Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999), it directs attention to approach motives
and to the relevance of events relating to rule adherence (Barsky et
al., 2011). By contrast, negative affect signals that something is
wrong in the environment and is associated with avoidance moti-
vations (Gray, 1987). This can focus attention on rule violations
(Barsky et al., 2011). Thus, affect can influence the salience of
different concerns (fairness motives; fairness vs. unfairness), how
events are appraised, and the aspects of the event that are relevant.
In their recent review, Fortin, Blader, Wiesenfeld, and Wheeler-
Smith (2015) argued that a deeper understanding of the intersec-
tion of fairness and affect can be gained by explicitly considering
the relationship between fairness motives and affect-based pro-
cesses. Further, they highlight the motivated nature of these pro-
cesses. For example, the valence of affect (i.e., the degree to which
the affect is characterized by pleasurable feelings) can determine
whether one is even motivated to engage in fairness-related rea-
soning, with negative affect initiating these processes and positive
affect dampening them. This relates to self-interested (instrumen-
tal) motives for fairness since it indicates that individuals are
motivated to engage in fairness-related reasoning when their self-
interest is threatened (but not necessarily when it is served).
Similarly, emotions that are high on uncertainty are associated
with the uncertainty reduction motive, moral emotions are related
to moral motives, and emotions high on social dynamic dimen-
sions (e.g., high on social orientation, inward emotions, and con-
gruence) are connected with relational motives. Taken together,
affect can determine whether motivated reasoning is initiated and
signal the importance of certain motives in that context, which then
focuses attention on different aspects of the situation. Further, the
activation of motives can also elicit specific discrete emotions
(e.g., moral motives may elicit anger and disgust; relational mo-
tives may elicit emotions such as loneliness). Moreover, these
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876 BARCLAY, BASHSHUR, AND FORTIN
processes can be activated in all of the parties to a fairness
interaction (e.g., recipient, observer, and actor).
Despite the presence of elaborate theories, researchers have
been slow to empirically investigate these processes and further
integrate cognitions and affect (Cropanzano et al., 2011). Whereas
many researchers still emphasize “cold” cognitive processes (as
exemplified by the pervasive use of indirect measures), our review
highlights the richness that can emerge when affect and cognitions
are studied in tandem and how the interplay between them can
influence the formation of fairness perceptions. Clearly, more
research is needed to explore when and how affect versus cogni-
tions can drive the processing of information and the implications
of these different starting points for the type and the nature of
processing that occurs. For example, research from a deontic
perspective implies that emotions are more likely to drive process-
ing when the individual has experienced violations of a moral or
identity-based nature (vs. instrumental concerns; Folger, 2001;
Frijda, 1988). This suggests that the fairness motives may be
intricately intertwined with the way that information is processed
and the emotions that are likely to be influential. Developing
insights into how and why affect can infuse cognitions may also
guide our understanding of how the formation of fairness percep-
tions can differ for cold versus hot cognitions and how these
different types of cognitions can be effectively managed.
In summary, although theoretical integration is occurring in this
area, empirical studies examining the implications of this integra-
tion are desperately needed. Motivated cognitions are woven into
the theoretical foundation of this domain, but empirical research is
in a nascent state, with numerous opportunities to examine how the
interplay between affect and cognitions can enrich our understand-
ing of the formation of fairness perceptions.
Research Question #4: How Does Perspective
Influence Fairness Perceptions?
Although the fairness literature has predominantly focused on
the perspective of the recipient, there has been an increasing shift
toward studying observers (those who are not direct recipients but
who witness the fair or unfair treatment of others; also termed
third-parties; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2004) and actors (those who
“deliver” fairness, e.g., managers; Folger & Skarlicki, 2001). In
this section, we examine how observers and actors form fairness
perceptions and highlight the strong (but often implicit) influence
of motivated cognition.
Key insights from the observer perspective. In their seminal
chapter, Skarlicki and Kulik (2004) outlined two primary motives
for why observers care about the fairness of others’ treatment.
Similar to recipients, observing unfairness can spark self-interested
concerns because observers want to avoid comparable treatment
and/or have internalized the harm caused to another. However, as
demonstrated by moral motives and the deontic perspective, ob-
servers can also care about others’ treatment for moral reasons.
Indeed, empirical evidence indicates that observers are willing to
protest unfair treatment and punish the transgressor, even if it
comes at a personal cost to themselves (e.g., Turillo et al., 2002).
Although much of the research in this domain has assumed that
these motives operate relatively independently, Skarlicki,
O’Reilly, and Kulik (2015) applied an adaptationist perspective to
argue that these motives can be complementary and operate simul-
taneously. That is, observers may react to the unfair treatment of
others because of innate and evolutionary-based psychological
mechanisms that center on moral concerns but these reactions can
also serve a self-interested function (e.g., by maintaining cooper-
ative behaviors in groups). Further, observers may not be con-
sciously aware of the self-interested nature of their reaction.
Observers are also motivated to consider a number of different
antecedents when forming fairness perceptions. There is some
evidence indicating that the recipient’s motives can influence
observers’ perceptions. Farrell and Finkelstein (2011), for exam-
ple, found that observers perceived rewards for organizational
citizenship behaviors to be fairer when their coworker was be-
lieved to have engaged in these behaviors for altruistic rather than
impression management reasons. Similarly, observers can weigh
allocation criteria differently, with equity being emphasized when
individuals want to reward and motivate performance and equality
being deemed as more fair when the goal is to decrease social
tension (Hysom & Fisek, 2011). Further, the broader social context
can also influence observers’ fairness perceptions. For example,
observers’ fairness perceptions can be influenced by their location
in the social network (e.g., Umphress, Labianca, Brass, Kass, &
Scholten, 2003) and/or by the culture or climate that has developed
within a group or organization (Naumann & Bennett, 2000; Rob-
erson, 2006).
Key insights from the actor perspective. Historically, the
fairness literature has been characterized by a managerial-centered
perspective. In other words, (un)fairness was important because of
its impact on outcomes of relevance to the organization (cf. Bies &
Tripp, 2002). Correspondingly, an emphasis was placed on how
managers can effectively manage the fairness perceptions of others
through their own decisions and actions (e.g., Leventhal, 1980)
and how organizations can promote fairness (e.g., through mana-
gerial training in justice principles; Skarlicki & Latham, 1996).
Given this focus, it is perhaps not surprising that research in this
area has been dominated by a strong behavioral emphasis, with
studies focusing on how managers enact or deliver fairness to
others—that is, how managers address the perceptions of others
(Brockner et al., 2015). Less attention has been devoted to under-
standing the fairness-related motives and perceptions of managers
themselves. In this section, we maintain the emphasis of our
review by focusing on fairness as a dependent variable as it relates
to perceptions rather than behaviors. A focus on perceptions is
critically important because it sheds light into how managers
experience fairness and these intrapersonal processes can enhance
our understanding of why one behaves in a certain way (cf.
Ambrose & Schminke, 2009b).
Of particular importance to the managerial perspective is the
notion that people are motivated to perceive themselves as fair
(e.g., Lerner, 1980). Being perceived as fair can have a variety of
positive outcomes for managers, including promoting positive and
mitigating negative behaviors in organizations (e.g., Colquitt et al.,
2001), providing managers with legitimacy for executing their own
work (e.g., Greenberg, 1990), motivating subordinates, and en-
hancing relationships with ones’ employees (Long, 2016). Beyond
these external outcomes, being a “fair person” is a desired social
identity and managers are motivated to engage in behaviors that
will establish and maintain this identity (Greenberg, 1990). That is,
perceiving oneself as a fair person may convey positive psycho-
logical benefits (e.g., esteem). Most individuals share a basic
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desire to be perceived as a fair person (Lerner, 1980), with some
managers placing even more importance on this aspect of their
identity (e.g., via differences in the self-importance of moral
identity; Aquino & Reed, 2002, or social identity; Skitka, 2003).
Empirical evidence supports the importance of this identity-based
perspective. In a multiround experiment, for example, Oc, Bash-
shur, and Moore (2015) showed that being perceived as unfair by
subordinates led managers to feel more guilt and behave more
fairly in subsequent interactions. Once they were perceived as
being more fair, their guilt was reduced (and they subsequently
became less fair). This demonstrates the potential for an effect of
managers’ beliefs about the perceptions of others (and oneself) on
actual behaviors. That is, managers will change their behaviors to
be seen as fair and to maintain their self-image.
Matching one’s behaviors with subordinates’ preferences may
be particularly important because managers can focus on different
aspects and/or conceptualize fairness differently than employees.
For example, Tata (2000) found that managers are more likely to
focus on procedural justice principles whereas subordinates em-
phasize distributive justice principles. Managers and subordinates
are also likely to use different reference points, which can influ-
ence the way that they process information and the presence of
various biases (e.g., self-serving bias; Charness & Haruvy, 2000).
In a qualitative study, Long (2016, p. 762) noted that “managers
reported emphasizing and combining particular elements of fair-
ness in ways that differed somewhat from established subordinate-
based conceptualizations.” Further, managers had a broader con-
ceptualization of the factors that enhance perceived fairness
beyond the traditional justice dimensions (e.g., factors that pro-
mote employee development, enact managerial propriety, and
demonstrate moral leadership). Taken together, these studies indi-
cate that the perceived importance of different justice criteria, the
scope of antecedents to fairness, and even one’s definition of what
constitutes fairness may change depending on one’s role in the
interaction.
Integrating perspectives with motivated cognitions. Theoretical
and empirical research in this domain is increasingly taking into
account the implications of fairness being in the eye of the be-
holder and is primed for a motivated cognition approach. In this
section, we highlight research indicating how a motivated cogni-
tion approach can enhance our understanding of the influence of
perspective on the formation of fairness perceptions and demon-
strate how this approach can facilitate integration across the per-
spectives.
With respect to the observer perspective, Skarlicki et al. (2015)
offered an integrated model of observer reactions to unfair treat-
ment, which emphasizes the cognitive and perceptual processes
that can guide observer reactions to the treatment of another.
Similar to recipients, when observers recognize that another person
has been negatively impacted, they are motivated to locate blame
(cf. Folger & Cropanzano, 2001). However, this process can be
influenced by the observers’ own motives. For example, observers
are more likely to perceive unfairness when they identify with the
victim (e.g., when they like the victim or when they have personal
or group similarities; Brockner & Greenberg, 1990) or feel that
their own outcomes may be threatened (Chaikin & Darley, 1973).
In contrast, observers are less likely to perceive unfairness when
they identify with the transgressor (e.g., Kramer, 1993) or when
the victim is perceived to be outside of the observers “scope of
justice” (i.e., outside of the boundaries for which one’s moral
values apply; Opotow, 1990). Blader, Wiesenfeld, Fortin, and
Wheeler-Smith (2013) also demonstrated the influential role of
social emotions in these processes; observers experiencing con-
gruent emotions with the victim tend to perceive the situation in
similar ways as the recipient, whereas observers experiencing
incongruent emotions with the victim (e.g., envy, jealousy, and
schadenfreude) are more likely to perceive objectively unfair out-
comes as fair.
Even when observers see objectively unfair treatment, their
perceptions may depend on their beliefs (e.g., desire to maintain a
belief in a just world; cf. Lerner, 1980). Specifically, individuals
are motivated to believe that people get what they deserve and
deserve what they get. However, these beliefs can be threatened
when observers recognize the unfair treatment of another, which
can motivate them to restore justice (e.g., Skarlicki et al., 2015;
Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). When observers perceive unfairness but
are unable to respond, they may experience guilt or distress
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994), which can motivate
them to reassess the situation (e.g., increase victim derogation,
align themselves with the transgressor, or reevaluate whether the
treatment was truly unfair).
Colquitt (2004) demonstrated how observers’ perceptions are
based not only on their own treatment but also on the treatment of
others (e.g., teammates in the same context). This study found a
powerful interaction in which one’s own fairness perceptions were
influenced by the treatment that occurred in the team, such that
positive reactions were more likely to occur when the fairness of
treatment was perceived as being consistent within the team. The
interaction was also stronger when task interdependence was high
(vs. low). This is consistent with a motivated cognition perspec-
tive, which indicates that observers should be more concerned
about the fairness of others when it impacts them and/or when they
perceive similarities with others (e.g., Skarlicki et al., 2015).
Research has also highlighted the importance of beliefs for
managers, especially beliefs related to being a fair person. Paral-
leling our earlier discussions on how accuracy motives can con-
strain directional motives and the illusion of objectivity, Scott,
Colquitt, and Paddock (2009) highlight how managers justify their
behaviors to uphold their beliefs about themselves. These authors
argue that while managers are unlikely to consciously decide to be
unfair, they may consciously engage in actions that may be per-
ceived as unfair but justify those behaviors as fair. Using the
example of a manager who denies an employee the opportunity to
appeal a decision, the authors propose that the manager may
acknowledge the lack of correctability but “fail to define the action
as unfair per se (after all, it was purportedly performed for reasons
that may benefit the functioning of the department)” (p. 758).
Thus, the desire to be perceived as fair may influence the way that
managers attempt to justify their decisions and actions, but these
justifications are not always shared or considered valid by others
(e.g., the recipients).
Managers’ fairness perceptions may also be influenced by the
range of perspectives that they should consider (e.g., their own
perspective as well as their employees, observers, and other stake-
holders) and by their beliefs about what others will consider to be
important in that situation (Kunda, 1999). This may shape the
goals they adopt (accuracy or directional). For example, whereas
managers who are only considering their own perspective may be
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guided by their own directional motives (e.g., relational) while
processing fairness relevant information, managers who know they
must also communicate this information to their employees may
incorporate motives that they think may be important to others
(e.g., instrumental for employees; moral for observers) as well as
more heavily weight the accuracy motive to ensure that their
communications are appropriate based on their assessment of the
situation.
Conversely, managers may also be motivated in some instances
not to perceive an issue as fairness-related (Brockner et al., 2015).
For example, some managers are predisposed to recognizing
and/or interpreting issues as fairness-related (e.g., those who are
high on justice sensitivity or justice orientation; Ambrose &
Schminke, 2009b), while others are not. Managers are also more
likely to be focused on fairness when they have the resources to
process fairness-related information (i.e., can engage in controlled
processing) and when their identity has been threatened. Managers
may also have motives that are activated other than fairness (e.g.,
efficiency; Folger & Skarlicki, 2001) that can change the way that
they frame the issue and communicate it to others (e.g., they may
focus less on adhering to justice criteria because this schema has
not been activated).
Clearly, managers are not only motivated to see themselves as
fair but can also be motivated to ensure that others perceive them
as fair so that they may garner psychological and social benefits
(e.g., esteem) by reinforcing their identity or by enhancing other
outcomes (e.g., ability to do their job). However, managers are
unable to achieve this goal simply by engaging in “fair” behaviors.
Instead, managers must be sensitive to potential differences in
perceptions for the same behaviors and recognize that they must
actively manage impressions of their behaviors to demonstrate
fairness to different organizational stakeholders (e.g., Greenberg,
1990). Specifically, Greenberg argued that subordinates evaluate
the fairness of their managers based on egocentric biases (i.e., what
is fair is what benefits me; Greenberg, 1987) and the degree to
which a behavior supports one’s self-image (e.g., what is fair is
what makes me feel good about myself; Greenberg, 1991). Thus,
managers who want to be “seen as fair” are encouraged to align
their actions with the needs, motives, and expectations of their
subordinates.
Taken together, a motivated cognition approach can provide
significant insights into the experiences not only of recipients but
also actors and observers. Although research examining the vari-
ous perspectives has developed relatively independently, it is also
important for researchers to consider the interplay between these
perspectives. We consider this notion below.
Creating a Path Forward: Leveraging Insights From
Motivated Cognitions to Develop a Research Agenda
for the Fairness Literature
Above, we examined how motivated cognitions can deepen
insights and facilitate integration within central research questions
that relate to the formation of fairness perceptions. In this section,
we expand our perspective beyond these specific research ques-
tions to explore some broader implications of a motivated cogni-
tion perspective. First, we provide examples of how motivated
cognitions can encourage integration across the research ques-
tions. Specifically, we highlight how a motivated cognition per-
spective can clarify the role of motives in fairness perceptions as
well as enhance our understanding of dyadic influences. Second,
we provide examples of the implications that a motivated cogni-
tion perspective has for how we study fairness issues, including the
importance of clarifying constructs and measures. Third, we fol-
low this by providing examples of how a motivated cognition
approach can facilitate integration with other literatures. Fourth,
we discuss potential boundary conditions of a motivated cognition
perspective within the context of fairness. Finally, we conclude by
“flipping the lens” and explore how using a motivated cognition
foundation can create new research opportunities that have not yet
been examined in the fairness literature.
Integration Across Research Questions
In this section, we explore how a motivated cognition perspec-
tive can provide integration across the research questions that were
discussed above. Specifically, we focus on how this perspective
can enhance our understanding of the motives, including their
interplay and integration as well as the influence of context. We
also broaden our discussion beyond the individual to consider the
role of dyadic influences.
Interplay and integration. One of the key insights emerging
from applying motivated cognitions to the fairness literature is the
recognition that the directional goals (e.g., instrumental, relational,
or moral motives) identified in fairness research may be con-
strained and influenced by accuracy goals. Although individuals
can be motivated to assess fairness in ways that “feel good” to
them, they can also be motivated to ensure that these evaluations
are rational and justifiable (Kunda, 1990; Scott et al., 2009).
Applying this insight across the research questions discussed
above suggests a number of new perspectives for understanding
how individuals process fairness information and allows for the
integration of research on automaticity versus controlled pro-
cesses, emotions, and perspectives. For example, different goals
can differentially focus people’s attention on fairness-relevant
information so that they highlight or ignore unfairness. These goals
may also activate different emotions; instrumental motives may
activate envy, relational motives may enhance loneliness, whereas
moral motives can spark moral outrage. These emotions can infuse
cognitions and may also influence the type of processing that
occurs. Similarly, different parties to the experience (e.g., recipi-
ents, actors, and observers) may be motivated by very different
goals. As we discuss below, this lack of agreement about what
information is relevant, how it is processed, and the potentially
disparate emotions experienced by the differently motivated par-
ties may also dynamically influence how events unfold, thereby
shaping (un)fairness perceptions over time. Clearly, delving into
these insights and process-based explanations can enhance our
understanding of how individuals form fairness perceptions, expe-
rience fairness, and how these experiences evolve.
Placing fairness motives in context. A focus on motivated
cognitions emphasizes that although fairness is a critical concern
(cf. Lerner, 1980), it is not the driving force for all interactions. For
example, individuals are often motivated by other concerns includ-
ing wanting to obtain favorable outcomes, maintaining self-
conceptions, appearing competent or legitimate, or following the
path of least resistance (cf. Brockner et al., 2015). Egocentric
concerns (van Prooijen, 2008) and efficiency concerns can also
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take precedence over fairness (Folger & Skarlicki, 2001). More-
over, individuals may view something as fair or overlook unfair-
ness because it is in their interest to do so (Cropanzano & Rupp,
2002).
The fact that people may be polymotivated is not a new idea.
However, explicitly recognizing this has important implications
for our understanding of how fairness perceptions emerge. For
example, it forces us to consider the relationship of established
fairness motives and alternative motives, including nondirectional
motives from the motivated cognition literature (e.g., accuracy,
efficiency). Further, it encourages consideration of how fairness
and nonfairness motives relate to one another in a given context.
Consider managers who need to deliver negative news—a multi-
phase process that involves preparation, delivery, and transition
(cf. Bies, 2013). Specifically, before delivering bad news, manag-
ers must prepare by processing the information themselves. The
presence of alternative motives may influence how fairness-related
information is attended to, the biases that can emerge, and even the
way that information is encoded (e.g., Tetlock, 1983, 1985). For
example, a manager who is motivated by maintaining a positive
self-concept may utilize different strategies than a manager fo-
cused on fairness. Further, even if managers are motivated to
deliver negative news in a fair manner, processing the situation
with a bias toward their own self-concept may influence the
information that is made salient and how they frame the situation
when communicating to an employee. Similar to the way that
accuracy goals can place constraints on the influence of directional
goals, the presence of nonfairness motives may influence the
impact of fairness motives and how fairness information is pro-
cessed.
Moving beyond individuals: The importance of dyadic
influences. Theoretically, there is strong recognition for the im-
portance of examining how the various parties (e.g., recipient,
observer, and actor) can dynamically influence each other. How-
ever, empirical studies examining these effects are still relatively
scarce. Given that each party can have differing motives, it is
critical to explore how fairness experiences unfold over time, as
motives change, and as different parties dynamically influence
each other. We propose that a motivated cognition perspective may
be particularly helpful for understanding these interactions. Con-
sider predicaments of injustice, defined as “an occurrence in which
one party believes he or she is being fair; however, the other party
does not perceive the transaction or interactions as such” (Cooper
& Scandura, 2012, p. 109). Differences in motives and perceptual
processes can shape the emergence of predicaments of injustice as
well as how they unfold over time (Bies, 1987; Cooper & Scan-
dura, 2012; Swann, 1987; Swann & Ely, 1984). Specifically,
managers and employees can experience incongruence in their
perceptions because they have divergent schema about what con-
stitutes fairness, are motivated by different considerations, are
paying attention to and processing different fairness information,
and/or are processing fairness information in dissimilar ways (see
above discussion; also see Folger & Cropanzano, 2001; Morrison
& Robinson, 1997). Whiteside and Barclay (2015) argued that
predicaments of injustice can trigger a “tug-of-war” in which the
manager and the employee simultaneously seek to protect their
self-conceptions by validating their own perceptions through strat-
egies such as self-verification (i.e., actions aimed at resisting or
disconfirming false social perceptions; Swann, 1987) and behav-
ioral confirmation (i.e., actions aimed at validating perceptions;
Swann & Ely, 1984). This highlights the importance of examining
the interplay between parties’ motives and perceptual processes as
well as how this impacts individuals, the relationship, and how the
situation unfolds.
Understanding fairness from a motivated dyadic perspective
may also help managers more effectively address fairness issues;
managers who understand their employees’ motives may be better
able to tailor fairness to meet these needs. Siegel, Brockner,
Wiesenfeld, & Liu (2016), for example, found that recipients have
a lower desire for process fairness when experiencing noncontin-
gent success (i.e., the perception that one’s positive outcomes are
not the result of one’s actions, such as when people are simply in
the right place at the right time). In these cases, recipients may find
fairness to be self-threatening (e.g., they experience anxiety about
whether the positive outcomes will continue) and want to engage
in self-protective actions. Rather than decreasing fairness, effec-
tive managers are likely those who recognize these needs in their
employees and provide additional support (e.g., by providing a
supportive environment, encouraging a promotion vs. prevention
mindset, providing ways to self-affirm). A motivated perspective
indicates that not only does fairness matter—the way that fairness
is delivered also matters.
Implications for Studying Fairness
A motivated cognition perspective not only has implications for
what questions fairness scholars should examine but also how
these questions are studied. In this section, we explore the impli-
cations of a motivated cognition perspective for the study of
fairness issues, including the importance of distinguishing between
fairness/unfairness and methodological considerations.
Distinguishing between fairness and unfairness. A moti-
vated cognition approach echoes calls in the fairness literature to
distinguish between fairness and unfairness (e.g., Bies, 2001;
Colquitt, Long, Rodell, & Halvorsen-Ganepola, 2015; Cropanzano
et al., 2011; Gilliland, 2008; Hillebrandt & Barclay, 2013) and
highlights several reasons for doing so. First, the antecedents of
unfairness and fairness are likely to be differently motivated.
Whereas perceptions of unfairness are likely to be shaped by
threats to one’s self-interest and a prevention focus (e.g., vigilance
and concerns about safety), perceptions of fairness are likely to be
shaped by a promotion focus (e.g., concerns about becoming one’s
ideal self; Colquitt et al., 2015; Fortin et al., 2015). Second,
fairness is likely to be driven by “cold” cognitions while unfairness
is likely to be driven by “hot cognitions” (Barsky et al., 2011;
Hillebrandt & Barclay, 2013). In terms of motivated cognitions,
this can prompt differences in what information is processed and
how it is processed, preferences for automatic versus controlled
processing, and the way that memories are encoded, recalled, and
used at a later time (Kihlstrom, Eich, Sandbrand, & Tobias, 2000).
Third, consistency in the fairness of one’s treatment may matter.
Matta, Scott, Colquitt, Koopman, and Passantino (in press), for
example, found that variability in treatment was associated with
greater uncertainty and stress than consistently fair or unfair treat-
ment. From a motivated cognition perspective, this variability may
influence the motives that are activated (e.g., control) as well as the
cognitive processes that individuals are likely to use (e.g., con-
trolled vs. automatic processing). Further, individuals may be
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motivated to “tip the scales” toward evaluations of unfairness or
fairness, simply to provide some relief from the constant process-
ing of fairness-related information and to provide certainty about
their status. Whereas “tipping the scale” toward fairness can en-
hance esteem, consistently perceiving unfairness can also be ben-
eficial. There is some evidence that individuals who become
habitually sensitive to perceiving themselves as being unfairly
treated (e.g., “collectors of injustice”) can benefit from being
assigned the label of “victim” because it can be identity-verifying
and even empowering (e.g., Swann & Read, 1981; Tripp & Bies,
2009). A motivated cognition perspective may provide insights
related to the motives and processes underlying these effects and
also potential points of prevention that may be targeted before
one’s perceptions of unfairness spiral into an entrenched judgment
of unfairness that cannot be shaken.
Methodological implications. Earlier, we noted the influen-
tial role of measurement and that the pervasive use of indirect
measures has guided the field toward how objective rules and
criteria have been subjectively filled (e.g., Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt
et al., 2015). However, this review highlights the importance of
assessing the subjectivity of individuals’ perceptions (e.g., one’s
motives may influence how perceptions are formed including what
criteria are evaluated). Further, many indirect criteria (e.g.,
whether procedures are based on accurate information) may be
more aligned with “accuracy” rather than directional motives
and/or these criteria may be differentially weighted depending on
one’s motives. Although measures that assess overall fairness
perceptions may be better able to tap into one’s subjective assess-
ment of fairness (e.g., Ambrose & Schminke, 2009a), these mea-
sures are not without their limitations. For example, overall fair-
ness is currently assessed through a primarily cognitive lens (e.g.,
“In general, I can count on this organization to be fair”) and
incorporates items related to fairness and unfairness (e.g., “Most of
the people who work here would say they are often treated un-
fairly”).
We argue that the current state of theory and measurement
highlights the importance of several key considerations. First,
researchers should reexamine our measures and ensure that they
reflect the distinguishing features of the constructs (e.g., justice vs.
fairness, justice vs. injustice, and fairness vs. unfairness). Second,
we echo calls for better alignment between measures and research
questions, such that researchers use the measure that is most valid
for the question at hand rather than simply adopting the most
widely used measure (cf. Colquitt & Rodell, 2015; Colquitt &
Shaw, 2005; Shapiro, 2010). Third, the literature has been domi-
nated by between-person approaches and static conceptualizations
of fairness (cf. Jones & Skarlicki, 2013). Although this approach
may enable researchers to examine what happens when a particular
motivation is activated, it is unlikely to tap into the richness of the
motivated cognition approach and how this can influence people as
they actively experience and respond to (un)fairness over time and
in dyadic situations. A motivated cognition perspective may be
most readily captured by qualitative methods that can provide rich
and deep insights into the subjectivity of experiences as well as by
within-person approaches that focus on processes that occur over
time. Further, multiperspective approaches can highlight how mo-
tivations differ between parties, how they dynamically change, and
how these changes influence individuals’ perceptions, emotions,
and behaviors. Given that the answers to our research questions are
shaped by the methodologies used, we encourage fairness re-
searchers to expand our methodological toolsets to tap into these
opportunities.
Insights into Other Fairness Questions
Although our review has focused on how motivated cognitions
can influence the formation of fairness perceptions, the usefulness
of a motivated cognition perspective is not restricted to this do-
main. In this section, we expand outward to note how a motivated
cognition approach can provide insights into other fairness phe-
nomena. Below, we discuss memory and self-regulation as exam-
ples of areas where motivated cognition may be particularly in-
sightful for advancing our knowledge on other questions that
fairness researchers are currently addressing.
Memory. Motivated cognition can have significant implica-
tions for memory. Individuals who are motivated to maintain their
beliefs (e.g., belief in a just world) are more likely to distort and
selectively remember the past in ways that support this belief (e.g.,
by engaging in selective memory biases to portray outcomes as
more fair; Callan, Kay, Davidenko, & Ellard, 2009). Memory is
also influenced by one’s state of mind at the time of the event and
how the event was encoded (e.g., Tetlock, 1983, 1985). Over time,
individuals are also more likely to remember the meaning that they
imposed on events and behaviors (i.e., the final evaluative judg-
ment) and often forget the details (i.e., the details that created the
perception). Consider an individual who perceives that his or her
manager failed to provide an adequate explanation or implement a
procedure properly. Moving forward, this person is more likely to
focus on the meaning created (i.e., the manager behaved “un-
fairly”) as opposed to recalling the specific behaviors that lead to
this assessment. When this happens, it becomes more difficult for
individuals to locate and use details from memory that could lend
different meaning to an observed behavior (i.e., the perception that
the manager was unfair is likely to persist; Kunda, 1999). Further,
memories of past events are typically reconstructed in ways that
are influenced not only by the expectancies, beliefs, goals, and
feelings at the time of the event but also by those that are active at
the time of recollection, which can further bias our memories in
systematic ways. Applying these insights to fairness can provide a
deeper understanding not only of how perceptions are formed, but
also how perceptions are aggregated, the stability of perceptions,
when/why they may be resistant to change, and how/when indi-
viduals can use information differently to reinterpret events.
Self-regulation. The role of self-regulation in fairness pro-
cesses is currently receiving increased scholarly interest across all
of the focal parties, including recipients (e.g., Thau & Mitchell,
2010), actors (e.g., Johnson, Lanaj, & Barnes, 2014; Whiteside &
Barclay, 2016), and observers (e.g., Rupp & Bell, 2010). Self-
regulation and motivated cognition are intricately intertwined. For
example, self-regulation is involved when individuals select which
goals to pursue (e.g., promotion or prevention, self-enhancement
or self-verification), which strategies are used to pursue one’s
goals (e.g., modifying perceptions of one’s self or others, seeking
or avoiding certain types of information), and when one controls
emotions, to name a few (Kunda, 1999). Whereas many studies are
currently focusing on the outcomes of regulation, motivated cog-
nition can also provide insights into why, how, and when people
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can engage in these self-regulation processes to manage fairness
issues.
Creating Opportunities for Integration Between
Fairness and Other Literatures
A motivated cognition perspective can also be used as a foun-
dation to facilitate meaningful integration between the fairness
literature and other domains, including moral judgments, behav-
ioral economics, ethical decision making, and behavioral ethics.
Consider behavioral ethics as an example—numerous scholars
have advocated for integration between behavioral ethics and
fairness (e.g., Crawshaw, Cropanzano, Bell, & Nadisic, 2013;
Cropanzano & Stein, 2009; Folger et al., 2005; Fortin, Nadisic,
Bell, Crawshaw, & Cropanzano, 2016; Schminke, Ambrose, &
Noel, 1997). An interesting find was that the reasons for proposed
integration are often (implicitly) related to motivated cognitions
(e.g., the presence of similar motives, the importance of identity;
e.g., Skitka, 2003).
We propose that a motivated cognition framework can provide
a strong and effective foundation for this integration. A motivated
cognition approach provides a way to assimilate the various fair-
ness and ethics-related motives and sheds light on how the various
forms of identity can influence information processing. For exam-
ple, research on moral convictions can broaden the focus of fair-
ness from a “convention” (i.e., expectation of conduct that does not
have a moral weight) to a moral conviction (i.e., internalized
beliefs related to ethical principles), which has stronger psycho-
logical meaning for the individual (Skitka, 2010; Skitka, Bauman,
& Mullen, 2008). A motivated cognition perspective predicts that
individuals will engage in different processing, depending on the
degree to which an individual has internalized beliefs on these
issues (Kunda, 1999). Similarly, individual differences in ethical
frameworks can influence perceptions of fairness. For example,
ethical formalists (i.e., individuals who emphasize moral judg-
ments as reflecting rules or principles rather than outcomes) are
more sensitive to procedural justice whereas ethical utilitarians
(i.e., individuals who emphasize outcomes) are more sensitive to
distributive justice (Schminke et al., 1997). Taken together, a
motivated cognition perspective can help guide the effective inte-
gration of these literatures by highlighting areas of similarities and
differences as well as by providing an organizing structure that can
focus the literatures on key issues (e.g., motives, processing, and
individual differences).
Boundary Conditions of a Motivated Cognition
Perspective Within the Context of Fairness
Given the pervasive implications of a motivated cognition per-
spective, this raises questions such as “what are the limits of a
motivated cognition perspective” or “where might this approach be
less useful for fairness”? The answers to these questions likely
reside in the assumptions underlying our discussion. Although
fairness scholars can be motivated to interpret situations through a
fairness lens, fairness is not relevant in all situations (cf. Shapiro,
2010). For a motivated cognition perspective to be influential for
(un)fairness, we assume that fairness is a relevant concern in the
situation and that the (un)fairness is self-relevant to the individual.
While self-relevance is not a necessary condition to trigger justice
reasoning, it may determine how strongly motivational processing
influences such reasoning. For example, studies using self-
regulation have shown that individuals are more likely to be
motivated by unfair events when these events are directly relevant
to the individual (e.g., when unfairness is blocking one’s goals;
Barsky et al., 2011; Karoly, 1993). This implies that motivated
cognitions may be less influential when individuals do not per-
ceive fairness to be a relevant concern and/or when (un)fairness is
not considered self-relevant, such as when unfairness is perceived
as mild, does not block one’s goals, and/or it is not fully experi-
enced (e.g., if the situation is too artificial to prompt authentic
fairness reactions and initiate genuine processing, such as in some
laboratory paradigms).
However, assuming that (un)fairness is relevant in a given
situation and considered self-relevant, when might a motivated
cognition perspective be less influential? Research from the mo-
tivated cognition literature may provide some clues. Some research
has indicated that motivated reasoning depends on the availability
of resources (e.g., Paharia, Vohs, & Deshpandé, 2013). Specifi-
cally, when cognitive resources are diminished, individuals are
less able to engage in the motivated processing of information.
This implies that motivated cognitions should be less influential
under conditions of cognitive load (e.g., when the demands on
working memory are high; e.g., Sweller, 1988) and/or regulatory
depletion (e.g., when regulatory resources are diminished; e.g.,
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998) because indi-
viduals do not have the capacity to shift resources toward process-
ing fairness-related information. However, it is also possible that
the motives may be differentially impacted by the availability of
resources. For example, accuracy motives may require more re-
sources than instrumental motives. This implies that the various
motives may also have different boundary conditions. That is, the
factors that activate and/or constrain each motive may differ,
which suggests that the motives may have varying influence under
disparate conditions. Future research should explore these effects.
Our above discussion is primarily based on the premise that
individuals are motivated to reach desired ends. However, indi-
viduals can also experience “amotivation” in which they are not
motivated to regulate in some situations (e.g., because of lack of
control, not valuing something, perceived incompetence; Ryan &
Deci, 2000). Individuals experiencing amotivation may have di-
minished drive to process information and, by extension, the
influence of motivated cognitions may also be less impactful in
these situations. Similarly, motivated cognitions may be less in-
fluential when the situation is unequivocal (i.e., in the absence of
ambiguity). Given that individuals are constrained by the “illusion
of objectivity,” we expect motivations to be more influential when
the situation has some uncertainty. However, when the situation is
so strong that it would be difficult to hold an alternative interpre-
tation (e.g., if there was universal consensus that something was
unfair/fair), motivated cognitions should be less influential.
“Flipping the Lens”: Using Motivated Cognitions as a
Foundation to Create New Research Directions
Above, we focused on how integrating a motivated cognition
perspective into the fairness literature can build on and enhance the
contemporary fairness literature while also considering the bound-
ary conditions that may exist for these effects. However, the power
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of a motivated approach goes beyond the existing literature and
has the potential to take fairness research into new domains that
have not been previously identified. In this section, rather than
integrating motivated cognitions into the fairness literature (i.e.,
using fairness as the conceptual foundation), we flip the lens and
consider how starting with a motivated cognition foundation and
integrating fairness into this literature can also create new oppor-
tunities for researchers. We argue that this approach can provide
novel research opportunities for both the motivated cognition and
fairness literatures, which can enhance our understanding of both
phenomena and their interplay.
From a motivated cognition foundation, examining the influence
of motives over time may enhance our understanding of the
antecedents and reactions to (un)fairness. Building on our above
discussion, it is likely that motives can influence how individuals
initially process fairness information and form heuristics. How-
ever, over the course of time, the influence of these motives in
forming the heuristics is likely to be forgotten, while the influence
of the heuristic persists. Similar to the way that an emotion can
become a mood as it loses its target and becomes more broadly
diffuse (e.g., Frijda, 1988), it is possible that a motive can remain
influential through a heuristic even as the specific motive fades.
Further, it would be useful to examine the processes that the
individual must go through to “undo” the influence of the motives
that were operational during the formative stages of the heuristic.
That is, how do motives shape the heuristic and does the individual
have to move back into the judgment stage and create a new
heuristic to diminish the influence of the motive that was opera-
tional at the time of its formation? What level of investment
(cognitive or otherwise) would an individual need to undo or
adjust such a heuristic and what would trigger such an investment?
For example, if a heuristic was created when the accuracy motive
was operational, does the individual have to move back into the
judgment phase if their motives change to instrumental or can
these motives shape the current heuristic and simply “nudge” it in
the direction consistent with the “new” motive? The motive that is
active at the time of the creation of the heuristic may also influence
the stability of the heuristic. Future research should examine these
processes.
We have argued that the motives may also influence the way
that individuals form their perceptions. Although previous research
has shown that individuals can be influenced by others’ fairness
perceptions when forming their own judgments (e.g., Degoey,
2000), studies have typically examined how individuals have re-
ceived this in a passive way, such as by overhearing one’s peers
(e.g., Jones & Skarlicki, 2005). However, research examining
gossip has demonstrated that individuals may actively seek infor-
mation from others by providing positive and/or negative evalua-
tive statements to others to confirm their own perceptions or gain
access to the information that they need to form their perception
(Brady, Brown, & Liang, 2017). We suggest that individuals may
seek out information when forming their fairness perceptions and
the motive that is operational at the time may influence how
individuals seek out this information. For example, if they want to
bond with others over an injustice (e.g., relational motive), they
may seek out peers who have also experienced injustice from the
same perpetrator (e.g., using their “friendship network” to find
support) whereas if they want accurate information, they may be
inclined to seek out information from other sources with unique
information about the perpetrator (e.g., find individuals more cen-
tral in the target’s social network who are likely to have access to
concrete information about the target). Taken together, this sug-
gests that individuals should be viewed as active in this process—
not just actively processing information but also actively seeking
(or avoiding) it, depending on their motives.
Given that individuals can have multiple motives, it may also be
important to examine “motives clusters”; that is, how clusters of
different motives can impact the processing of information and
subsequent reactions. For example, even if a moral motive is a
dominant theme of two clusters of motives, a morally themed
cluster that also includes accuracy and relational motives is likely
to operate differently than a morally themed cluster that also
includes instrumental and efficiency motives.
Clearly, the motivated cognition perspective is not only impor-
tant for enhancing our understanding of the existing literature but
can also push scholars into new research avenues that are novel for
the fairness literature and that can enhance our understanding of
fairness issues.
Conclusion
Motivated cognitions have long been implicitly embedded in the
fairness literature. Throughout our review, we have highlighted
how explicitly examining the fairness literature through the lens of
motivated cognition can integrate seemingly disparate streams of
existing theories and research questions, provide new insight into
fairness processes, and build a foundation to create synergies with
other fields. Further, this approach opens novel and theoretically
important research questions, has significant methodological im-
plications, and can provide insights into how fairness can be
effectively managed in the workplace.
Importantly, the fairness literature has evolved to a state where
the conditions are ripe for a fruitful integration. We strongly
encourage fairness researchers to explicitly examine how integrat-
ing motivated cognitions can further enrich our understanding of
the subjectivity of fairness and other important fairness-related
questions. Further, we encourage researchers to go beyond simply
replicating findings from the motivated cognition literature. In-
stead, our understanding can be significantly deepened by consid-
ering how motivated cognitions might inform the situational and
temporal boundary conditions of our theories (e.g., Bamberger,
2008) and mechanisms that explain relationships among them
(e.g., Cappelli & Sherer, 1991). These insights can be reintegrated
back into theory, which not only enhances our understanding of
fairness but can also create a more comprehensive theory of
motivated cognition (cf. Bamberger, 2008). Taken together, exam-
ining motivated cognition within the context of fairness can un-
doubtedly spark new and meaningful insights. Applying a moti-
vated cognition lens not only enhances our theoretical knowledge
but also ensures that the fairness literature continues to compel-
lingly speak to those who experience and those who must manage
fairness issues within organizations.
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